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ABSTRACT

The traditional views of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are examined in terms of modifications necessary for application to persuasion in interpersonal communication contexts. To obtain guidance for ways in which the traditional concepts may be modified, a framework consisting of selected work by Erving Goffman and Ernest Becker is presented. From this framework, four elements needed by a social actor to be a successful interpersonal persuader are developed: self-esteem, social knowledge, a repertoire of face-saving strategies, and instrumental orientation (motivation to engage in goal-directed behavior). The implications of these elements for audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are then examined. (Author/FL)

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A MODEL OF INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION

by

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A MODEL OF INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION

Persuasive communication has long been a primary interest of scholars in speech communication. Clearly, the field's academic roots are grounded in ancient rhetorical theory and today scholars with diverse theoretical and methodological preferences continue to engage in research on persuasion.[1] Within this tradition, attention has focused primarily on persuasion in mass audience contexts, especially live public speaking settings where a source addresses a large group of individuals.[2] In comparison, the literature on persuasion in interpersonal communication contexts appears to be less extensive and perhaps less clearly prescriptive. The purpose of this paper is to present a model of interpersonal persuasion. It is in no way intended to fill any large void in the literature on interpersonal persuasion. Rather, the intention of the paper is to contribute to a growing interest in the general area of interpersonal communication and perhaps to provide a heuristic stimulus to scholars interested in approaches to interpersonal persuasion.

Primary Terms

Given the multitude of perspectives on interpersonal communication and persuasion, a reasonable starting point for this essay is the articulation of how these terms are used here.

Interpersonal communication. Interpersonal communication refers to social interaction where individuals show mutual attentiveness and reciprocally influence one another through their intended and unintended symbolic behavior. This definition may apply to face to face interaction or to some electronically mediated interactions like those on the telephone and intercom. Of central importance to the view of interpersonal communication presented here is the dynamic interplay of speaker/listener roles,

i.e., interpersonal contexts allow for, in fact demand, the dynamic exchange of speaker/listener roles among participants. What is especially important about this characteristic is that it places a considerable demand on social actors to adapt their cognitive and overt behavior immediately to another. The implications of this characteristic for interpersonal persuasion will be discussed shortly. For now, attention is turned to the definition of persuasion assumed in this essay.

Persuasion. The definition of persuasion used in this essay shares basic characteristics with many other definitions proposed over the years. In particular, is an emphasis on intentional, goal-oriented behavior and the means for acquiring such goals (i.e., symbolic behavior).[3] Persuasion is defined as verbal and/or nonverbal behavior that results in instrumental effects in others.[4] Although this definition may be applied from other perspectives (e.g., a critic, a persuadee), it is primarily grounded in the persuader's point of view, as are most definitions which emphasize intentional, goal-oriented communication.

While the proposed definition of persuasion is viewed as considerably more flexible than many current definitions, it is also true that within the context of expansionist rhetoric the emphasis on intentional, goal-oriented communication may be viewed by some scholars as too restrictive. It does not appear possible to resolve all such discrepant viewpoints, as they seem inherent in the complex process that scholars are attempting to explicate.[5]

The concept of intentional, goal-oriented communication and its role in the interpersonal persuasion model will be addressed more completely later on in the essay. Suffice it to say for now that the purpose of this brief introduction has been to explicate how the terms "interpersonal" and

"persuasion" are used in the essay. Given the definitions of these terms, the remaining sections of the paper explicate the proposed model of interpersonal persuasion.

Modifications Necessary for Interpersonal Persuasion

While there are probably countless theoretical formulations about the persuasion process, the general approach seems not to have changed substantively for centuries. Persuasion is typically viewed as essentially an adaptive process whereby the would-be-persuader seeks and gathers relevant information about the environment and applies the information in some way to achieve desired goals. Often the terms audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are used in reference to this process. These also serve as the basic components of the currently proposed approach to interpersonal persuasion. However, a major premise of this essay is that certain modifications in the traditional views of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are necessary for them to be applied adequately to persuasion in interpersonal communication contexts. Guidance for how the traditional views may be modified is found in the essential characteristics of interpersonal communication and persuasion. For this paper, the essential characteristic of interpersonal communication is the dynamic exchange of speaker/listener roles among participants. The essential characteristic of persuasion is that it is intentionally, goal-oriented communication.

Implicit in most definitions that stress goal-oriented communication as persuasion is the idea that the goal is a preplanned objective. Moreover, audience analysis often is viewed as an information gathering procedure that is guided by the preplanned goal, as are subsequently devised and implemented rhetorical strategies. This perspective is probably

largely a function of scholars' general inclination to emphasize persuasion as occurring in mass audience contexts (live or mediated). Typically, persuasion in these contexts focuses on preplanned objectives that stress attitude/behavior change regarding political, social, religious and/or economic issues, usually in some campaign format.[6] While this approach to the concept of goal has been useful for persuasion in mass audience contexts, it has some limitations that are especially problematic for persuasion in interpersonal contexts.

The traditional view of preplanned goals tends to de-emphasize, or omit entirely, the kind of goals that are not preplanned, but yet are important to the persuasion process. These goals arise from the moment to moment interaction between persuader and intended target. They are concerned with the need for the persuader to adapt his/her communicative behavior immediately to the intended target of persuasion. The wide variety of contexts and dynamics of interpersonal communication suggest that the concept of goal should include (if not stress) serendipitious opportunities for on-the-spot development and attainment of desired objectives.[7] In addition, the concept of goal should include long term implications that extend beyond the immediate situation, but also include subtle, momentary objectives such as demonstrating interest, agreement, and a desired comportment to the intended target.

The traditional views of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are not capable of addressing well, if at all, how the persuader is to attain goals that arise during the course of interaction. The modifications necessary to apply these concepts to interpersonal persuasion must provide some means for the persuader to adapt to a changing, socially-constituted, reality in a manner that will increase the chances of obtaining

information relevant to the design and implementation of goal-oriented strategies. In what specific manner, then, may the concepts of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy be modified to accomplish the needed requirements? Further guidance in answering this question may be found in a framework for viewing interpersonal communication.

A Framework of Interpersonal Society

Given that the nature of interpersonal communication is the central impulse for modifications in traditional persuasion concepts, it seems reasonable to expect that an examination of the interpersonal context will reveal specific directions for how the concepts can be modified. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to ask a rather penetrating question: How is interpersonal society possible?

Interpersonal society is understood as the fundamental process whereby individuals coordinate their behavior and direct it toward the accomplishment of some understanding of reality.[8] Following Goffman and others,[9] what is assumed to make interpersonal society possible is a system of politeness that defines obligations and expectations that individuals have regarding one another's behavior within situational parameters. This is assumed to be a fundamental and universal basis of all societies.[10] However, only a brief summary of Goffman's views is discussed here to illustrate the point and serve as a conceptual framework for the model of interpersonal persuasion.

Goffman begins his model of interpersonal society with the observation that every person lives in a world of social encounters involving him/her in face to face or mediated contact with other people. Goffman indicates that in each of these encounters the individual acts out a line:

> . . . that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself.[11]

However, he is quick to point out that:

> Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him.[12]

Immediately apparent in Goffman is an assumed reciprocal, transactional nature of social reality. He reminds the reader, for example, that ". . . the individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts."[13] Later Goffman reveals the extent to which individuals are mutually united in social interaction. For example, in discussing fundamental principles of human communication he says:

> When an impropriety such as manneristic gesturing occurs, this becomes noteworthy and hence noted not because something is being communicated, but because the rules regarding how one is to demean oneself when in the presence of others are broken. Verbal and non-verbal communication is something that is funneled through something else. This something else is the approved patterns of manner and association or co-participation in terms of which individuals are obliged to regulate their comings together. To act in a psychotic manner is, very often,

> to associate wrongly with others in one's immediate presence; this communicates something, but the infraction in the first instance is not that of communication but of the rules for co-mingling.[14]

It is clear throughout Goffman's presentation that his view of interpersonal society is grounded in a fundamental system of politeness that allows for the co-ordination of individuals' behavior.[15]

Given this perspective one may ask: Why are individuals motivated to organize social life in this manner? Goffman's response seems to be found in the concept of face:

> The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.[16]

Indeed, what is critical to Goffman's model is that social actors are morally bound to one another by considerations for face. The balance of the social order depends upon the individual's regard for his/her own and others' face. Acts which introduce inconsistencies in regard to one's face and/or another's face are likely to tear a delicately woven social fabric. Moments of embarrassment, for example, are offered as illustrations of how incongruous acts can disrupt a fragile, symbolically-constituted, social reality. Accordingly, the expressive order is sustained by each actor's assumed responsibility for regulating the flow of events that constitute a social encounter. This responsibility is grounded in a concern for face and is demonstrated by the social actor's face-work; that is:

> . . . the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to counteract "incidents"--that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten face.[17]

Even from this brief sketch of Goffman's work it is clear that (1) society is viewed as grounded in a system of politeness and (2) individuals are assumed to have a fundamental desire to maintain face. Ernest Becker[18] has expressed similar views, although he is perhaps even clearer than Goffman about humans' desire to avoid loss of face. However, Becker does not use the term "face" to explicate his ideas. Instead, he uses the more widely employed term "self esteem."[19]

Becker eloquently argues the premise that a highly developed ego is what separates humans from other animals. By ego, Becker means the acute sense of I which allows for an absolute separateness of self from the environment. Without an ego an animal exists in timelessness. Only humans, says Becker, can untangle a flow of consciousness and relate a self to past, present and future, thus fixing a world of events in a point of self-reference.

Becker takes his reader through a fascinating journey of human evolution to support his claim. After briefly discussing the role of selected fundamental biological factors in human evolution, Becker introduces the concept of ego. He first carefully details a Meadian explanation of the acquisition of a concept of self. He then builds upon this by examining in detail the role of the Oedipal transition in human development. Becker argues that it is in the Oedipal Transition where the child exchanges physiological means of supporting the ego for symbolic means; that is, he/she learns to switch modes of maintaining self esteem:

> Self-esteem becomes the child's feeling of self-warmth that all's right in his action world. Thus, the seemingly trite words "self-esteem" are at the very core of human adaptation. Self-esteem is the warm inner feeling

> of self-righteousness that arms the individual against anxiety. The ego has finally come into its own as an effective control when the organism is no longer at the mercy of a stimulus-response relationship to anxiety. The self-esteem is a natural systematic continuation of the early ego efforts to handle anxiety. It is the durational extension in time of an effective anxiety-buffer. . . . Self-esteem is then an integral part of the self-system. If we had to give one definition of "human nature," it would derive from this crucial need: Man is the only animal who needs a symbolic constitution of his worth.[20]

Throughout Becker's well written discussion of human evolution and ego development he makes one point especially clear: humans pay dearly for having a highly developed sense of I. The symbolic world of ego is a self-conscious world. Everything is labeled in reference to the I and once the child enters this world he/she cannot act like other animals. The human must act according to prescription, as opposed to purely instinctual patterns of response. In other words, to avoid anxiety humans must choose the "right" thing to do -- ". . . life becomes moral and meaningful. Morality is merely a prescription for choice; and 'meaning' is born as the choice is carried into action."[21]

As in Goffman, again it is seen that humans are morally bound to one another through concern for face.[22] However, what Becker emphasizes is the fundamental reason for the bond--a desire to avoid anxiety through loss of self esteem. Becker apparently believes that a primary and basic function of face to face interaction is the development and maintenance of

self esteem. Whatever else humans are, they are animals who must have a symbolically constituted sense of self worth. This view in consort with Goffman's framework of interpersonal society results in a perspective which emphasizes humans' propensity for politeness in terms of their basic desire to avoid anxiety due to the loss of face/self esteem. Given this perspective on interpersonal society, what specific implications are there for the traditional concepts of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy? This question is addressed in the following sections of the essay.

Elements of Interpersonal Persuasion

It has been assumed that a way to uncover essential elements of interpersonal persuasion is to ask: What fundamental competencies/abilities would a social actor need in order to be a consistently successful interpersonal persuader? A response to this question suggested four elements.

Self esteem. As indicated already, self esteem is central to the foundation upon which the framework of face to face society rests. Accordingly, self esteem is assumed to be related in complex ways to the entire process of interpersonal persuasion. For example, self esteem appears to be a necessary ingredient for the onset of systematic persuasion and also an end result of it. In other words, some degree of self esteem seems necessary for an individual to have enough self confidence for attempting to exert control over the environment. At the same time, the periodic reinforcement from instances of successful goal achievement in turn serves to bolster self confidence and self esteem. The complexity of this relationship seems in part a function of the role that language plays in self esteem development and the doing of persuasion. Language, or more particularly interactions with others, is the basis for humans' development and maintenance of self esteem. Language is also the medium by which

interpersonal persuasion is done. Similar complex relationships involving the role of language may be observed with respect to other elements of the model.

Social knowledge. The competent persuader must possess a fair amount of knowledge about the rules of social behavior that are pertinent to the context of persuasion. The literature on the "rules perspective" often contains conflicting views on the nature and function of rules.[23] However, for purposes of this paper the intricacies of the rule-law controversy are ignored in favor of an approach that might be called a common sense level of understanding. Rules are viewed as having two general functions: constitutive and regulative.[24] Rules operate constitutively by bringing "the game" into existence. They operate regulatively by providing the means for sanctioning behavior. These general functions of rules appear at the very heart of the interpersonal persuasion model. The competent persuader must first determine what "game" is being played. Given this understanding of the constitutive function of rules, the persuader can assess the regulative functions of the appropriate rules. In other words, he/she can attempt to determine the probable limits of the moral binding that unites self and other in a particular moment in time. From the constitutive and regulative rule assessments, the persuader can choose a strategy that may evoke the proper ceremonial formula and permit/compel face-sustaining behavior on the part of his/her interlocutor.[25]

Self esteem and level of social knowledge sophistication[26] are expected to relate positively. It has been suggested that social knowledge allows the persuader to understand the context of which he/she is part by assessing the constitutive and regulative dimensions of rules. Self esteem would appear to contribute to an individual's social knowledge by providing a

sense of self confidence about his/her interpretations of the social phenomena that comprise the reality of moment to moment social interaction. Given this confidence, the social actor can presumably make critical judgments about the social reality (and test them if necessary), thus acquiring a sense of social knowledge that would appear at least qualitatively different from an individual's judgments who was experiencing a loss of self esteem.

Repertoire of strategies. Goffman is quite clear that a social actor must acquire a repertoire of face-saving strategies in order to perform competently in the social arena. While an individual's repertoire of strategies may be quite diverse, the framework of face to face society suggests that specific strategies share a common bond. This bond is expressed in two fundamental orientations that Goffman considers necessary for competent facework: a defensive orientation toward saving one's own face, and a protective orientation toward saving the other's face.[27] The delicate balance between these orientations is critical to the application of the interpersonal persuasion model. The specific implication of these orientations will be addressed later on in the section on rhetorical strategies.

Repertoire of strategies is assumed to relate positively to self esteem and social knowledge. First, self esteem again serves as the confidence basis for the acquisition and implementation of strategies developed from a variety of experiences in human interaction. Second, social knowledge would presumably be operating at some level during these experiences, as it is an integrating function of repertoire of strategies. In other words, as the self esteemed individual interacts he/she learns how to behave appropriately (with reference to social rules) and modifies the range and sophistication of his/her social knowledge. The sophistication of one's social knowledge then serves as the basis for a repertoire of strategies.

The more sophisticated the social knowledge, the more diverse and flexible the repertoire of strategies.

Instrumental orientation. A third type of orientation toward the social seems necessary in addition to Goffman's defensive and protective orientations. The view of persuasion as intentional, goal-oriented communication suggests that an instrumental orientation is also necessary for the successful application of the interpersonal persuasion model. The term "instrumental orientation" is used here in reference to a general motivation to engage in covert and overt behavior that is goal-directed. It involves the inclination to use language in order to create situations that are conducive to goal attainment, as well as the disposition to take advantage of serendipitous opportunities for goal development and attainment during an interaction. As true for other elements in the model, the phenomenon of instrumental orientation can be extremely complex. It is probably a function of learning and heredity factors that influence general behavior patterns over several years. John Flavell[28] has presented an especially useful analysis of various stages of development that may relate to an individual's instrumental orientation. This is particularly true of the need component of his model of interpersonal inference.

So far it has been suggested that self esteem, social knowledge and repertoire of strategies are positively related. Instrumental orientation is also expected to be related positively to these elements. First, the self confidence that goes hand in hand with self esteem is considered necessary to any orientation that points to goal directedness in the social arena. Second, the emphasis on the element of social knowledge in the interpersonal persuasion model is, of course, with respect to obtaining desired goals in social situations. An instrumental orientation toward the social environment would appear necessary for the acquisition of social

knowledge with this emphasis. Third, an instrumental orientation would appear presupposed by the element of repertoire of strategies, since such a repertoire would likely develop in response to a desire to obtain personal goals. In addition, the likelihood of such a repertoire being overtly demonstrated would appear to be a function of some motivation for goal attainment and the self confidence necessary to enact such attempts.

The essay has now reached a critical point. What remains is to connect the previously discussed four elements with the framework of interpersonal society and, thus, draw out the implications for modifications in the concepts of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy. Ernest Becker provides an excellent starting point for such a task in a statement that succinctly captures the logic of the interpersonal persuasion model:

> The proper word or phrase, properly delivered, is the highest attainment of human interpersonal power. The easy handling of the verbal context of action gives the only possibility of direct exercise of control over others. . . . By verbally setting the tone for action by the proper ceremonial formula, we permit complementary action by our interlocutor. Not only do we permit it; we <u>compel</u> it, if he is to sustain his face. By properly delivering our lines we fulfill our end of the social bargain, and oblige the other to fulfill his in turn.[29]

In addition to reinforcing the general model of society discussed previously, Becker's observation nicely captures the essential implications for audience analysis and rhetorical strategy in doing interpersonal persuasion. Yet, there are still important, lingering questions:

How is such "interpersonal power" obtained? By what means can the persuader select the "proper ceremonial formula" and properly deliver his/her lines in order to "oblige the other to fulfill his" end of the social bargain? These questions are addressed in the following sections of the paper.

Implications for Audience Analysis

Much has been written over the centuries about the concept of audience analysis. However, the general thrust of this work has not deviated significantly from the idea that the essential task of audience analysis is to understand the target of persuasion. As Burgess[30] has lucidly demonstrated, even coercion implies some system of cooperation that allows the coercer to anticipate the target's likely responses to threats of violence. Such anticipation presupposes at least a minimal understanding of the target's likely point of view. Similarly, Ralph Turner[31] has argued that the successful manipulation of others requires the manipulator to engage in adaptive-reflexive role-taking, whereby an individual seeks to understand another's perspective without taking it as one's own. More recently, Delia and his associates[32] have demonstrated that individuals' sophistication of persuasive strategies is associated with increasing ability to adapt to the target's perspective.

If the essence of audience analysis procedures is to understand the target of persuasion, how can such understanding be accomplished in interpersonal communication contexts? A response to this question may be found in the previously discussed elements of interpersonal persuasion.

Self esteem and understanding. Self esteem appears to play a fundamental role in understanding an intended target's perspective. First, it might be assumed that self esteem implies a reasonably accurate assessment and understanding of one's own strengths and weaknesses. In short, self acceptance/understanding seems to be an intrical part of one's self esteem

system. Further, it may be assumed that greater self acceptance/understanding is likely to be associated with greater tolerance for others. If these assumptions are reasonably accurate, it would appear that an individual's self esteem level has a considerable impact on one's ability to take another's perspective.

While some individuals probably will counterdict the assumptions about self esteem, self understanding and perspective taking, considerable evidence suggests that the relationships are reasonable ones to propose.[33] Yet, self esteem alone does not provide too much direction for assessing the possible modifications needed in the traditional views of audience analysis. For more specific direction, additional elements of interpersonal persuasion must be examined.

Social knowledge and understanding. The element of social knowledge is especially relevant to concerns about audience analysis. In effect, social knowledge underscores the importance of analyzing interpersonal encounters at a basic structural level as opposed to a generally assumed taken-for-granted level of social understanding. The would-be-persuader is required to look beyond the surface of social interaction and determine what rules are operating to guide expectations and obligations for socially appropriate behavior. Given this view of audience analysis, the interpersonal persuasion model suggests the utility of applying various metaphors that may surface a less than taken-for-granted perspective on social interaction. Two metaphors that seem potentially useful in this regard are communication as game and communication as drama. Considerable effort has been expended on both of these mataphors and it is not possible to examine all of the relevant literature here.[34] However, the basic logic of these approaches to the study of human communication can be summarized briefly and related to the concept of audience analysis.

The game and drama metaphors are especially useful when they are applied to behavior that is not seen by participants as game play or drama.[35] When applied in this way the metaphors tend to surface an underlying ritual-like structure of communication that is not typically seen by participants who are affectively engaged in "real" behavior. Accordingly, the metaphors have the potential of allowing an individual to look beyond the taken-for-granted structure of social reality and more closely examine its underlying structure.[36]

There is, however, at least one dimension of this process that seems potentially problematic. It centers on the problem of simultaneously being both a participant and an observer of social reality. In his essay on Alienation From Interaction, Goffman[37] outlines four modes of misinvolvement that speak to the difficulties experienced when an individual is not fully participating in the social reality of which he/she is supposedly part. It perhaps goes without saying that a would-be-persuader must maintain a balance between the roles of participator and observer lest he/she misconstrue the very reality he/she is attempting to influence. While this basic requirement may be obvious, it is not at all clear exactly how one accomplishes the objective. Herein lies the significance of instrumental orientation in the doing of audience analysis.

Instrumental orientation and understanding. The concept of instrumental orientation underscores the fundamental importance of a desire to obtain personal goals. Unfortunately, it also tends to construe the interpersonal persuader as a self-centered, manipulative individual who thinks only of his/her own needs. However, it must be emphasized that personal goals do not necessarily have to be obtained at the expense of targets, they may also include objectives that are mutually in the best interests of both persuader and persuadee.

Moreover, the concept of instrumental orientation is not intended to mean that the competent interpersonal persuader is one who is preoccupied with goal attainment. As already indicated, such preoccupation would likely result in alienation from the very social situation that the persuader attempts to influence. On the contrary, the concept of instrumental orientation presupposes a fundamental involvement with the social.[38] The competent interpersonal persuader is not preoccupied with desired goals, but is an involved participator in the social interaction of which he/she is part. Such involvement in communication encounters allows for goal directedness to be transparent to the act of communicating because the social actor's consciousness is directed to the ongoing relationship between self, alter and situation. In this manner goals are developed and attained as a "natural" part of the give and take of interpersonal communication.

Interestingly, a considerable portion of the literature on communicative competence construes the competent interpersonal communicator as one who can achieve personal goals.[39] Moreover, competence models that also stress the importance of socially appropriate behavior suggest that personal goals must be obtained without loss of face to self or others.[40] Such a view is clearly compatible with a model of interpersonal persuasion that is grounded in Goffman's concept of interpersonal society. In fact, the line between interpersonal persuasion and interpersonal competence may often become rather blurred.

As already suggested, the concept of instrumental orientation is grounded fundamentally in a view of competence which suggests that the social actor must be a fully participating member of the social situation. This view of goal-directedness underscores the relationship to understanding in the doing of audience analysis. To accomplish audience analysis in the

interpersonal communication context the social actor must extend full attentiveness and perceptiveness to the situation of which he/she is part.[41] Such participation in communicative encounters will likely increase the chances of perceiving opportunities for goal development and attainment. However this goal-directedness is a result of full participation in interpersonal encounters, not a determent to it. As such, an instrumental orientation is basic to the understanding process that is central to the concept of audience analysis.

Repertoire of strategies and understanding. Given previously discussed relationships between repertoire of strategies and other elements of the model, it is reasonably clear that this element also has implications for audience analysis. For example, it might be assumed that the more sophisticated an individual's repertoire of strategies the more likely one is to be successful in acquiring needed information about the intended target of persuasion. Such strategies might include ways of keeping the target talking by employing open ended questions and well placed back channels (e.g., yes, tell me more), while subtly refusing optional turn-taking gestures from the other. However, the element of repertoire of strategies is even more directly relevant to the implications for rhetorical strategy.

Implications for Rhetorical Strategy

The co-ordination of individuals in interpersonal society is fundamentally based on a system of politeness that guides how people are expected to behave toward one another within situational parameters. Add to this a fundamental desire to avoid anxiety due to loss of self esteem and the implications for rhetorical strategy become rather apparent. It would seem that effective rhetorical strategies must generally allow the

persuader and persuadee to save face by their grounding in the fundamental politeness structure of the social situation in which persuasion occurs. Recall Becker's observation that:

> By verbally setting the tone for action by the proper ceremonial formula, we permit complementary action by our interlocutor. Not only do we permit it; we compel it, if he is to sustain his face. By properly delivering our lines we fulfill our end of the social bargain, and oblige the other to fulfill his in turn.[42]

Rhetorical strategy in interpersonal persuasion contexts essentially involves the selection of "the proper ceremonial formula" and the proper "delivering of our lines."

The selection of a proper ceremonial formula has already been addressed in the previous section on audience analysis. If understanding of the target traditionally has been the central idea of audience analysis, the major focus of rhetorical strategy seems to be the successful application of the knowledge gained through audience analysis (i.e., the development and implementation of messages designed to achieve the desired goal). The processes of audience analysis and rhetorical strategy always have been rather intimate, but their closeness is further emphasized when persuasion in interpersonal communication contexts is addressed. It is especially difficult to determine in the later contexts where audience analysis ends and rhetorical strategy begins. The relationship of these processes is not unlike the intricate tie between role-taking and role-playing.[43] Audience analysis in interpersonal contexts is substantively a cognitive process, whereas rhetorical strategy involves cognitive and overt behavioral processes. This is seen even clearer when considering the implementation phase of rhetorical strategy.

Given that audience analysis provides the basic understanding of self, other and situation, rhetorical strategy uses this information to create language behavior that plays upon the implicit politeness structure so as to obligate the target to behave in reasonably predictable ways. Of course, there is no guarantee that the target will conform to the implicit rule structure, regardless of the motivation to avoid loss of face.[44] However, no theory of persuasion can guarantee success.

Because of the situation-bound nature of rhetorical strategies it is difficult to provide specific direction regarding their application in the interpersonal persuasion model. While future research may attempt to delineate a typology of strategies, as some recent research has tried to do,[45] it is not likely that such an approach will be particularly useful beyond the initial stages of some preplanned types of interpersonal encounters. Instead of a typology approach, rhetorical strategies might be better grounded in a concept of communicative competence that stresses how one is to adapt his/her behavior to another. Goffman's discussion of the defensive and protective orientations of facework seem to provide this kind of guidance to the concept of rhetorical strategy.

At the very heart of Goffman's model of interpersonal society is the defensive orientation toward saving one's own face and the protective orientation toward saving the other's face. This dual orientation is the cement that binds individuals together as a social unit. As long as social actors demonstrate these orientations toward one another the fundamental system of politeness is operative and it places "pressure" on individuals to behave appropriately within the parameters of the social situation. To say that the competent interpersonal persuader is able to achieve desired goals without loss of face to self or other is to place the concept of rhetorical strategy in the very fabric of interpersonal society.

Of course, sometimes rhetorical strategies that violate normative expectations can be quite effective (e.g., coercion).[46] However, these strategies are not applied without some risk to the persuader. In many instances the risks may far exceed the value of the desired goals. Accordingly, there are ample instances in which adherence to the implicit rule structure will be a more effective approach to persuasion. Research in limited kinds of interpersonal contexts suggests support for this position. For example, considerable research findings in bargaining studies suggest that individuals tend to administer rewards and punishments on the basis of implied norms of reciprocity.[47] Cialdini and his associates[48] have found a similar norm operative in non bargaining contexts, where an individual simply makes a request of another. More recently, Cantor[49] reported findings that suggest persuasive appeals that play upon politeness rules are generally more effective than other types of appeals.

Perhaps the idea of grounding rhetorical strategies in the politeness structure of the social context is not unique to persuasion in interpersonal communication settings. Clearly, traditional concepts like common ground establishment and the usual separation of coercion from persuasion suggest that rhetorical strategies generally have been assumed to be within acceptable limits for social behavior. However, the dynamics of interpersonal communication seem to place an added emphasis on such strategies. The demand for immediate adaptation to the target of persuasion has, in part, suggested that interpersonal rhetorical strategies be grounded in communication competence models that stress socially appropriate behavior. The suggestion is that such an approach is an effective way of integrating the need to adapt behavior to the social expectations of others and at the

same time emphasize the attainment of personal goals. However, this approach also emphasizes the complexity and difficulty of the interpersonal persuasion process.

A significant implication of grounding rhetorical strategies in competence models is that it implies rhetorical strategies in interpersonal communication contexts involve more than the application of principles to message development (e.g., principles on fear appeals, use of evidence, two-sided arguments, and so on). It suggests that the successful persuader is first and foremost a competent interpersonal communicator. One implication of this is a suggestion that the research in interpersonal competence and persuasion be integrated to provide maximum direction for future work in interpersonal rhetorical strategies. A second, and related implication, is that research and instruction in interpersonal persuasion take into account the possible relevance of individuals' communicative competence. For example, it may be necessary to assess the communicative competence of individuals who are selected to participate in laboratory research on interpersonal persuasion. Similarly, some account of individuals' competence may be necessary for field research such as that found in studies in rhetorical criticism.

As for implications concerning instruction, it would appear that a blending of research in interpersonal competence and persuasion may provide a useful pedagogical framework. The blending may be especially important for interpersonal persuasion-related courses that involve a performance component (e.g., practice interviewing, small group interaction). Expecting a less than competent interpersonal communicator to learn effective interpersonal persuasion strategies may be analogous to expecting a person experiencing stage fright to learn effective public speaking persuasion techniques.

In summary, it should be recognized that the implications for audience analysis and rhetorical strategy are not meant to be definitive in any way. Rather, they are offered as examples of the ways the proposed model of interpersonal persuasion may influence traditional concepts of persuasion. As indicated at the outset of this paper, the primary objective is to provide a heuristic stimulus for additional work in interpersonal persuasion. To this extent, the proposed model is viewed as useful. Some initial empirical research on the model suggests that its logic is supported by how people behave in a laboratory setting.[50] However, additional research of various kinds is needed to assess the utility of the model.

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[2]There are exceptions to this such as research in counterattitudinal behavior and bargaining. See Gerald R. Miller, "Counterattitudinal Advocacy: A Current Appraisal," Advances in Communication Research, ed. C. David Mortensen and Kenneth K. Sereno (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973); Gerald R. Miller and Michael Burgoon, New Techniques of Persuasion (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973); Thomas M. Steinfatt and Gerald R. Miller, "Communication in Game Theoretic Models of Conflict," Perspectives on Communication in Social Conflict, eds. Gerald R. Miller and Herbert W. Simons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974).

[3]There is considerable variance in the way symbolic behavior is used to delineate persuasion and distinguish it from other forms of influence. Compare, for example, the treatments given by Gerald R. Miller, "On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions," Persuasion: New Directions in Theory and Research, eds. Michael E. Roloff and Gerald R. Miller (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); Park Burgess, "Crisis Rhetoric: Coercion vs. Force," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (1972), 61-73;

Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1976). The way in which symbolic behavior is used in this essay has been most influenced by the perspective provided by Park Burgess.

[4]Donald J. Cegala, Fundamentals of Persuasive Communication. Unpublished manuscript, 1979. [Available through The Ohio State University Bookstore, Derby Hall Branch.]

[5]See Gerald R. Miller, "On Being Persuaded"; Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis.

[6]Interestingly, most of the laboratory research on persuasion as attitude change has not examined campaign effects, but rather one-shot efforts to persuade.

[7]It must be stressed that preplanned objectives are not irrelevant to persuasion in interpersonal contexts. Certainly, a job interview, marriage proposal, and bargaining session are among several examples where preplanned objectives are indeed relevant. However, the interpersonal communication context is such that there is a limit as to how much preplanning of strategy can reasonably be done and implemented. The give and take nature of communication provides so many possibilities and uncertainties that the best laid plans are often abandon or at least modified considerably to accommodate the demands of a continuously changing social reality.

[8]One can, of course, go far afield in discussing what is meant by reality. See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); Paul Watzlawick, How Real Is Real? (New York: Vintage Books, 1976). Perhaps

oversimplifying Goffman's Frame Analysis, what is meant by reality here is the sense that individuals have about what's happening at a moment in time. Accordingly, an understanding of reality can be articulated by addressing Goffman's question: What's going on here?

[9]Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959); Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967). Also see Esther N. Goody, ed. Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

[10]See Esther N. Goody, Questions and Politeness. In this volume especially see Penelope Brown and Steven Levinson, "Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena," pp. 56-289.

[11]Goffman, Interaction Ritual, p. 5.

[12]Ibid., p. 5.

[13]Ibid., p. 84.

[14]Ibid., p. 143.

[15]See especially Goffman's chapter on deference and demeanor, Interaction Ritual, pp. 47-96.

[16]Goffman, Interaction Ritual, p. 5.

[17]Ibid., p. 12.

[18]Ernest Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962).

[19]See Morris Rosenberg, Conceiving the Self (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979).

[20]Becker, pp. 79-80.

[21]Ibid., p. 51.

[22]It is important to emphasize that self esteem and face do not refer to the same phenomenon. Self esteem is the general sense of self worth that a person has. Self esteem does fluctuate with significant changes in the environment, however, it is a more stable, general sense of self that represents multiple experiences over some period of time. On the other hand, face is a momentary aspect of self esteem that is tied directly to the ongoing social reality of who one is and what's going on at a particular moment in time. Although most likely related to self esteem, face is a much more changeable, situation-bound phenomenon of experience.

[23]See, for example, Charles R. Berger, "The Covering Law Perspective as a Theoretical Basis for the Study of Human Communication," Communication Quarterly, 25 (1977), 7-18; Donald P. Cushman, "The Rules Perspective as a Theoretical Basis for the Study of Human Communication," Communication Quarterly, 25 (1977), 30-45; Stephen E. Toulmin, "Rules and Their Relevance for Understanding Human Behavior," Understanding Other Persons, ed. Theodore Mischel (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1974); Peter Collett, ed. Social Rules and Social Behaviour (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977).

[24]Lawrence Rosenfield, Laurie Hayes and Thomas Frentz, The Communicative Experience (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1976). Also see John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Douglas Ehninger, "On Inferences of the 'Fourth Class'," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (1977), 157-162.

[25]Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning.

[26]The term "sophistication" is used here as a general reference to the structure of social knowledge. The specific nature of this structure is not yet articulated, but it may have some resemblance to O'Keefe and Delia's notions of cognitive complexity. In other words, it is probably a system of constructs that may be described in terms of differentiation, integration, abstractness, comprehensiveness and other dimensions. See Barbara J. O'Keefe and Jesse G. Delia, "Construct Comprehensiveness and Cognitive Complexity as Predictors of the Number and Strategic Adaptation of Arguments and Appeals in a Persuasive Message," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 231-240.

[27]Goffman, Interaction Ritual.

[28]John H. Flavell, "The Development of Inferences About Others," Understanding Other Persons, ed. Theodore Mischel (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1974).

[29]Becker, pp. 103-104.

[30]Burgess, Crisis Rhetoric: Coercion vs. Force.

[31]Ralph H. Turner, "Role-taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 61 (1956), 316-328.

[32]See Jesse G. Delia and Barbara J. O'Keefe, "Constructivism: The Development of Communication in Children," Children Communicating: Sage Annual Reviews of Communication Research, VII, ed. Ellen Wartella (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979); Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, "The Development of Functional Persuasive Skills in Childhood and Early Adolescence," Child Development, 47 (1976), 1008-1014; Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, "Cognitive Complexity, Social Perspective-Taking, and Functional Persuasive Skills in Second-to Ninth-Grade Children,"

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[37]Goffman, Interaction Ritual.

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[43]See Walter Coutu, "Role-Playing vs. Role-Taking: An Appeal for Clarification," American Sociological Review, 16 (1951), 180-187; Robert L. Kelley, W. J. Osborne and Clyde Hendrick, "Role-Taking and Role-Playing in Human Communication," Human Communication Research, 1 (1974) 62-74; Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role-Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior."

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